BGW2 EV18

Ymgyrch Senedd i Gymru / Parliament for Wales Campaign

Response to Better Governance for Wales

Dr John Cox

Implement and enable

The Richard Commission has made three major recommendations to improve the governance of Wales:

1. A legislative Assembly with more powers - the Commission judged the current settlement to be "unsustainable".
2. To raise the number of AMs to 80 - the current 60 being judged (already) too few for effective scrutiny and for the anticipated future extra duties.
3. To replace the unpopular and discredited AMS electoral system by STV.

If subject to the same rules as Councillors, MPs would be duty-bound to act on its unanimous recommendations or face a threat of surcharge for the money wasted on the commission’s work. But MPs have their own views and make up the rules.

To be charitable, many reservations are about the timing - not the principles. Assuming, as a working hypothesis, that their concerns are genuine and have merit, the challenge is to legislate for the non-contentious proposals without foreclosing those that that the MPs currently consider premature.

This could be done by "enabling legislation" - to allow the National Assembly, at its leisure, to decide when each provision is activated - following the precedent set for Scotland that enables their Parliament to decide when or if to activate tax-varying powers without requiring further permission from Westminster.

In principle, the new Government of Wales Act could "enable" the National Assembly to activate any section of the Richard Commission package that is not to be implemented immediately. However, it will be prudent to add a proviso be added that two thirds of the AMs must be in favour to activate any specific "enabled" power.

A two-thirds majority

A two-thirds majority is a political statement disguised as a numerical hurdle. It ensures that the leading political party controls the pace of devolution - but does not allow any single minority party to block its progress.

Once the Commission’s proposals are on the statute book, awaiting activation by a two-thirds consensus in the National Assembly, there will be no need for more legislation. Particularly in case a future London government may be unsympathetic to Welsh aspirations, this will strengthen the hand of the National Assembly if it has the right, already on the statute book, to activate this additional legislation.

This legislative strategy could take much heat out of the current debate.

It would aid the passage of non-contentious legislative proposals by designating all contentious issues as requiring a two thirds majority before they can be activated. This ought to be politically acceptable to all but those implacably opposed to devolution.

Assembly Members

The number of AMs also could be dealt with by "enabling legislation" - leaving it at 60 for the next Assembly election but, empowering the National Assembly, when a two-thirds majority agree from their experience that more are needed, to increase the number up to 80. The alternative (freezing the number at 60) could prove disastrous.

If, as the Commission suggests, a National Assembly of 60 members proves inadequate to cope with their extra duties and needs to ask Westminster for legislation to raise the number, it could take two more terms to enact. With the public less than impressed already by the National Assembly, delay could prove fatal to its credibility.

The low public esteem of politicians is, without doubt, why no-one dare call for more AMs in an election year - even though this proposal may prove essential to help overcome the problem. The Commission identified the existing workload as a reason for the AMs’ current under-performance and it is improbable that any improvement is possible whilst they have to spread their talents over 4-6 subject committees.

Electoral implications

There is no impediment to having 80 AMs elected by the current system (AMS) - but the consequences would be unpalatable for the Labour Party. Unless their votes jump from 38% to 48% on the regional lists, Labour cannot hope to win an overall majority. It so happens, however, that the adoption of STV would be advantageous to Labour and, although not a valid argument in favour of STV, it is a pragmatic reason why Labour may prefer STV over the AMS alternative.

In a nutshell, STV is likely to increase voting turnout - an unsung advantage of STV that ensures that the votes cast better represent the political will of the electorate. In the context of Welsh politics, this will increase the voting share of the Labour Party and has the potential to improve its prospects of winning an overall majority.

Voting turnout

Low voting turnout is not a side-issue for devolution: it undermines its most compelling justification - to redress the democratic deficit from 18 years of rule by "unpopular" Westminster governments. It is ironic that the "unpopular" governments all won 22-25% of the Welsh electorate vote - half as much again as the 16% who voted for "our" Welsh Assembly Government (In 2003 Labour won42% of the vote on a 38% turnout).

By the criterion of popular mandate, Rhodri Morgan has even less legitimacy than John Redwood. Unless this is addressed, the continued existence of the National Assembly and a devolved Welsh government must remain in doubt. The Richard Commission recommendation for STV is a pre-requisite for increased voting turnout (though not itself a guarantee that it will materialise). The wonder is, on examining the nature of our current voting systems, that even a paltry 40% bother to vote.

In the recent General Election, as for the National Assembly, the results were foregone in all but (at the most) 8 constituencies (for 80% of the electorate). For the National Assembly elections, every regional vote for Labour was wasted whilst, in the constituencies, over 60% voted for losing candidates!

In short, over 80% might just as well have stayed at home and, for those who did vote, more than 60% will be disappointed with the outcome. Our current voting systems might have been designed to discourage participation.

STV addresses both these issues. It ensures, for 3+ member constituencies, at least 25% of the voters will vote for a winning candidate (and thus take some comfort from the result) and that there is a genuine contest in every constituency (even in Cynon Valley and Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney!). It is no accident that the turnout in the 24 'safe’ Labour seats was, on average, 10% less than the 16 'contested’ seats.

This is illustrated by the chart, listing the Welsh constituencies in their sequence from the lowest turnout (Alyn & Deeside, below 25%) to the highest (Ynys Môn, above 50%). The shaded horizontal bars show (on the right) which party won the seat and, only if the contest was close, the runner-up party (on the left).

Of the top ten for turnout, Labour won only two (Rhondda and Cardiff North): in contrast, only two of the bottom thirty constituencies were won by the opposition (Cardiff Central and Wrexham). The inescapable conclusion, unpalatable as it may be for the opposition parties, is that the votes understate Labour’s true support - because, over most of Wales, its supporters have no incentive to vote.

Whilst it is usual to blame our disproportional voting system for giving Labour too more seats, a fairer criticism would be that it gives Labour too few votes. What both Labour and Welsh democracy needs, is a voting system that encourages more people to vote - not only those fortunate enough to live in a marginal constituency.

Representative democracy

Whilst at the last election over 60% voted for losing candidates, we also have an extraordinary outcome in that the leading party is unrepresented over 70% of Wales - with their AMs being confined to local constituencies. In contrast, the opposition may cherry pick issues and target constituencies for the next election - this injustice being inherent in our flawed AMS voting system.

The fundamental defect of AMS is that it creates two antagonistic types of AM. Unfortunately, Labour is so obsessed with the "Clwyd West anomaly" that it may be content to stamp out this relatively trivial nuisance and fail to grasp the opportunity, afforded by the Commission, to scrap AMS completely.

Given that Labour has not won an overall majority, even using AMS and with the opposition in disarray, it is astonishing that Labour remains unconvinced of the advantages (for Labour) of STV. It eliminates every anomaly of AMS, not just the current obsession. It could be adopted for the 2007 election for a 60-member National Assembly and, whisper it quietly, is more likely to allow the party to win an overall majority. Labour certainly has nothing to lose and both the credibility and legitimacy of the National Assembly would be enhanced by a higher voting turnout.

Sadly, to ensure unanimity, the Commission fudged their recommendation in relation to its implementation. Rather than base the STV constituencies on the local authority boundaries - thus allowing the National Assembly to decide the timetable, they left open an alternative option of utilising obsolete Westminster constituencies - thus leaving the unelected Boundary Commission in control of its implementation.

To simplify the legislation and speed up the process, the new legislation only has to specify that all STV constituencies are to elect 3-6 members according to five simple rules, to administered by the National Assembly:

1. Divide the latest total Welsh electorate by the pre-determined desired number of AMs to obtain the average electorate/AM ratio.
2. Divide each local authority electorate by this ratio to obtain the entitlement to AMs of each authority ('rounded’ to the nearest whole number).
3. For authorities whose entitlement is above 6, sub-divide this authority into two roughly equal constituencies based on local ward boundaries to return 3-6 AMs.
4. For authorities whose entitlement is below 3, pair with a nearby local authority to create a single STV constituency to return 3-6 AMs.
5. If the total number of AMs calculated above does not match the number desired by the National Assembly (due to 'rounding’ errors), adjust the ratio until it does.

Using this enabling legislation, the next National Assembly could be elected by STV for any number of AMs between 60 and 80 and would not require extra updated legislation whenever the Boundary Commission alters a Westminster constituency.

The table illustrates what is feasible using the local authority boundaries if, in their wisdom, the National Assembly decided to retain 60AMs or increase the number to 67, 73 or 80. Once the latest electoral rolls become available, the allocation of AMs to each STV constituency may be calculated in microseconds.

Notes:

 These figures are no longer current

* Cardiff has to be sub-divided when the entitlement exceeds 6

 The Vale of Glamorgan has to be paired with Bridgend if its entitlement is less than 3

The legislative process will be much simplified if, rather than rewriting the recommendations of the Richard Commission and second-guessing what may be a future consensus on implementation priorities, the recommendations are all included in the new legislation for implementation either immediately or when by a two-thirds majority, the National Assembly determines the time is right.

This approach could remove the bitterness of some recent debate and restore the remarkable unanimity achieved by the Richard Commission.

Dr John Cox, Executive Committee, Parliament for Wales Campaign